Athitaw Hla Aung - History of the Arab-Israeli War

Translator's note 

I have translated a book about a murderous war that I would not have allowed in my conscience but was passionate about in my nature.

Those who have read my translation of “The Arab-Israeli Six-Day War” about the Israeli army commander-in-chief, General Moshe Dayan (now the Minister of Defense), will be well aware of this. You will remember that it was Moshe Dayan who won the Arab-Israeli War that took place from June 5 to 10, 1967.

"Moshe Dayan became famous because of the Sinai War in 1965. He was recognized worldwide as a brilliant general. He was even nicknamed the "Hero of Sinai."

The book I am translating now is about the "Battle of Sinai". The author of this book is General Moshe Dayan, who won that battle and earned the title "Hero of Sinai".

This book is a daily account of that war written by Moshe Dayan himself.

There is no other book that can give a more complete, detailed, and accurate account of the Sinai War than this one. When a general writes so thoroughly about a war he himself led, there is a certain taste that comes to mind. I have tried my best to make that taste come through in my Burmese translation. If the taste is not yet apparent, I would like to take it as my own fault.

I would like to express my gratitude to Professor U Myo Chan (Department of History, Workers' College) who helped me find the necessary books and documents and information to translate this book.

Beautifully supported 

Zeyawaddy, May 9, 1968

General Dayan's order 

This book was published shortly after the war ended. The war was fought in 1956. The Sinai War then lasted eight days. The Sinai War of 1967 lasted only five days. The war also saw the capture of the western part of Jordan and the Golan Heights and Bashan in Syria.

Not only that, in the Sinai Peninsula War of 1956, 35,000 troops and 200 tanks participated in the fighting, but in the Sinai Peninsula War of 1967, 100,000 Egyptian troops and 950 tanks participated in the fighting.

My diary of the Sinai Peninsula war is completed in the room where we spoke with David Ben-Gurion, who became Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. I met Ben-Gurion on the last night of the war. I reported to David Ben-Gurion that Sharm el-Sheikh had been captured and that the war was over.

I have recorded my concerns about the ability to handle the political conflict that has just begun. There are reasons for concern.

The Sinai War of June 1967 was the war that led to the political arrangements after that war. Israel had previously handed over the Straits of Tyre, which had been occupied by the Israeli army, to the United Nations Emergency Force. The task of the United Nations Emergency Force was to ensure the freedom of navigation of Israeli ships under international law. Thus, the freedom of navigation of ships existed for more than (10) years.

However, Egyptian President Nasser decided to go to war with Israel. He believed that he would win. On the same day that he made this decision, President Nasser demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations troops. In response to his request, the UN Secretary-General ordered the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping forces.

Since then, on June 22, 1967, we have been faced with the situation that existed before October 1956. Egypt has banned Israeli ships from sailing through the Strait of Tyre. Moreover, the Egyptian military is preparing to engage in a military confrontation with the Israeli forces. By blocking the passage of Israeli ships through the Strait of Tyre, President Nasser has effectively declared war on Israel. However, the result of this action is the opposite of what he had expected.

As I have written, this time the war ended in six days. The Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian armies were defeated. Israeli ships were once again able to sail freely and safely through the Red Sea. However, the political struggle for a solution had only just begun.

Debates and negotiations are taking place in the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, and in capitals around the world. They are planning to replace the war that has occurred with peace.

These issues raise questions. Will the Arab states recognize Israel? Will they accept Israel's right to exist? Will they accept and establish peaceful relations with Israel? Or will they wipe Israel off the map? This time, they will be defeated. They will be insignificant. But when they again believe that they can compete with Israel and defeat it, they will make a new attempt. They will try to destroy Israel.

My situation is different from what it was in 1956. That is why I am having difficulty writing this letter now. I am no longer a general.

After our War of Independence (1949), Israel and the Arab countries signed a peace treaty.

The Arab leaders have once again renewed their ambitions to attack Israel and wipe it off the map. Not only have they refused to abide by the terms of the armistice and build peace, but even after the ceasefire, they have been active on the border, attacking Israeli civilians, and committing acts of aggression.

The Israeli government initially viewed these actions as acts of war and remnants of war. It called on Arab countries to respect the terms of the agreement. “Israel also pursued a course of tolerance and restraint.

However, by the middle of 1954, anti-Israeli terrorism had become worse and worse. In the following months, it became increasingly clear that these incidents were not the work of individuals, but were being carried out systematically by a group, and that Egypt was responsible and that the Arab governments were acknowledging and abetting the aggression. Israel was not yet aware of the reality. The security situation was getting worse and worse. It had been growing steadily since the days of the war in 1948, and now it reached its worst in 1955-56.

The three main reasons for this tension are Egypt's preparations for a war that would completely destroy Israel, the threat of Israel by trained guerrillas from Arab countries, and the blockade of Israeli ships in the Gulf of Attara...

In September 1955, the arms deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia was tantamount to Egypt's decision to go to war with Israel. Egypt received a large amount of modern military equipment from the Czech Republic. Israel understood that this military equipment was a reinforcement of Egypt's intention to go to war, and that it was a step towards war. Israel was determined to prevent the Arabs from acquiring large amounts of modern military equipment as soon as possible and to profit militarily from it.

The Czechoslovak military equipment that Egypt acquired included 530 armored vehicles, 230 tanks, 200 armored personnel carriers, 100 artillery pieces, 500 artillery pieces of various sizes, 200 fighter, bomber and transport aircraft, warships, destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines, and a large number of other military equipment.

This military equipment was the most powerful in the entire Middle East at that time. It was a force far greater than anything that had ever existed before. By adding this weapon to Egypt's existing military strength, the military strength of Israel and the Arab countries became incomparably greater. Originally, Egypt had 200 tanks. Israel also had 200 tanks.

Now, not including the strength of other Arab countries, Egypt alone has four times more armored vehicles than Israel.

The same is true of the air force. Previously, Egypt had 80 jets, while Israel had only 50. Now, Egypt has 200 fighter and bomber jets. As a result, the air force is four times larger. Israel's strength in terms of artillery, naval power, and combat weapons is not encouraging. Egypt is not only superior in numbers, but also in terms of modernity and efficiency.

The Egyptians have at least two times the number of Meteo and Orion fighter jets they have. They are more powerful and modern. Their Russian-made T-34 tanks are far superior to the old M3 Shaman tanks we have.

As his military power grew, Nasser's prestige and influence among the Arab people increased significantly. He was also widely recognized as a prominent leader within the Arab League.

“On October 19, 1955, the Egyptian-Syrian Joint Military Directorate was put into effect. By October 1956, as expected, Jordan had joined, forming a three-nation Joint Military Directorate.

Under these circumstances, Israel was once again confronted with the reality of its situation, as it found itself caught between three enemy Arab armies, each under the command of a single commander in the east, south, and north. Now faced with three united and united invading armies, there was no longer any doubt as to whom to directly oppose.