University of Nandamuri - Nineteen Forty Two

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When the Burma Campaign began, the British general in command of the Burma Army was "Maclock." He had only two divisions under him.

General MacLachlan, who was nearing the end of his service and preparing to retire, was reluctant to provide morale or military support to repel the invading Japanese. Neither the British military headquarters in London nor the British Far East Command in India was willing to provide him with the necessary support, both in terms of weapons and equipment.

To repel an incoming enemy attack with just two armies is like trying to block a breached dam with two sandbags.

General MacLeod's military campaign was also controlled by the Governor of Burma, on the instructions of the Bill government. General MacLeod demanded that the troops deployed in Lower Burma be consolidated. Only then, he argued, would they be able to fight back the enemy who had come in droves. However, the Governor of Burma insisted that the troops remain deployed as usual.

The No. 1 Division is deployed throughout Shan State, which borders Burma's eastern border.

The 17th Division was deployed from Mawlamyine to Myeik. As a result, the British troops were no longer organized as a large army, but more like a military police force to suppress the frequent rebellions.

If all two divisions were assembled and the Japanese were to enter Thailand in full force, where they were preparing to set up a base camp, and maintain the situation, the enemy's advance would be reversed. The British would have been able to break one of the enemy's arms, which was poised to invade Burma.

But, weren't the British just waiting inside Burma, just as someone who was to be hanged anxiously awaits the day of his death?

During the first part of the Burma campaign, I heard a lot about the actions of the elders who were too thoughtful and hesitant, and the young subordinates who liked to bite, not only criticized them, but also sometimes became stubborn and did whatever they wanted.

Among the incidents I heard, I felt that the stubborn action of a British battalion commander was something I, as a journalist, should not forget to record.

On the very day the Japanese invaded and occupied Bangkok, the capital of Thailand, the battalion commander, without asking for any orders from his superiors, led all the soldiers in the battalion to attack Thailand from Lower Burma, at his own insistence. The superiors ordered the battalion commander to retreat. When the battalion commander returned, his superiors sternly warned him to abandon the idea that the only way to defeat the enemy was to attack immediately...

I also heard that, whether rightly or wrongly, the British officers considered this incident to be a self-inflicted wound.

For commanders who believed that the best war was an offensive, it was disheartening to see higher authorities take harsh action against a battalion commander who had marched to attack Thailand.

Many military observers have been oblivious to the policy of sitting back and waiting without advancing to the enemy's position, without supporting or criticizing it. They are trying to resolve the situation in Burma through political and diplomatic means in order to gain military control.

If the British had invaded and occupied Thailand before the Japanese arrived, it would take too much time to answer here. This is an important issue, because a war can be resolved by various factors.

In any case, it is clear that if the British had entered Thailand before the Japanese entered and launched an offensive, the situation would have been much different than if they had not entered.

General Mack Locke, who was on the Burma front, should not be blamed for not launching an offensive against Thailand. Instead of responding immediately to the enemy, did all the Allied powers adopt a policy of hesitation? The British in particular adopted a policy of hesitation.

The obsession with the British commanders was a disease transmitted from the authorities in London, Delhi, and Washington.

Some observers have suggested that if there had been one or two American troops willing to attack, the Japanese would have faced defeat at the outset of the Burmese campaign. This view was also expressed by the Tsar's generals. If there had been a loyalist army, they would have been able to crush the revolutionaries who opposed the Tsar.

In making this comment, the Tsar's generals forgot one very important fact.

The fact that the royal troops betrayed them was not the real reason, but rather the fact that the momentum of the revolution was rising like a rising tide.

At this time, there were no American troops in Burma, and there was no reason to believe that there would be any. The policy of the United States was to concentrate all its troops in Europe. This not only delayed the war throughout Asia, but also demoralized all Allied troops.

Japan, while proclaiming "Asian egalitarianism," plans to wipe out British and American frontier troops in the Pacific with force.

To this end, Japan had been recruiting soldiers from all over the country for years. The country's entire political, economic, and social structure had been transformed into a war zone. By 1941, Japan was ready to drive out any Allied forces in the Pacific.

A large army of 3,000,000 people has been formed.

On January 11, 1942.... Military intelligence members reported that "about 5,000 enemy troops were present at Mae Sot."

Mae Sot was only 20 miles from Kawkareik, where a British army was stationed. It was only 70 miles from Mawlamyine as the crow flies. The British troops stationed at Kawkareik were the 17th Brigade. The commander was Jackie, a Victoria Cross recipient. Despite being a Victoria Cross recipient, the situation he faced was so overwhelming that he could not move.

Intelligence members also reported on January 11 that there were about 5,000 enemy forces in Mae Sot. When the air force was sent to scout the area on January 13, they said that there were no enemy forces in Mae Sot.

Not satisfied, he reconnoitered again on January 15. He reported again that he had found no enemy.

However, between January 15 and 16, an enemy force of 250 special forces and 1,000 infantry began attacking Maektasha, near the Thai-Burmese border.

The enemy forces, after capturing Metta Sha, where the British border guards were stationed, reached the Tanintharyi River. From there, they again advanced towards Dawei.

At this very moment, news was received that an enemy army, 500 to 1,000 strong, was advancing on Myeik.